Cases

To determine whether granting an irrevocable power of attorney with property alienation powers automatically triggers, via legal fiction, an onerous transfer subject to IMT under Article 2(3)(c) of the CIMT, or if such a provision constitutes a rebuttable presumption (presunção ilidível) that allows evidence to the contrary regarding the absence of an underlying transfer of ownership.

The Tax Authority argued that the mere existence of an irrevocable power of attorney objectively fulfills the taxable event, regardless of proof of a sale agreement or actual payment. Conversely, the taxpayer maintained that the power of attorney was issued strictly within a mandate for interest management, without transferring economic disposal power over the asset or receiving any financial consideration, thus lacking an effective transfer of wealth.

The Court concluded that the provision in question does not establish an unassailable legal fiction, but rather a rebuttable presumption. The reasoning was based on the premise that IMT applies to effective transfers of assets, and legal form must yield to economic reality. In this specific case, the court found that the evidence provided—demonstrating the absence of financial flows (price) and the non-existence of promissory contracts or other ancillary transfer acts—was sufficient to rebut the presumption of transfer. The court reiterated that if the absence of an underlying onerous transaction is proven, the taxable event does not occur.

The annulment of the IMT assessment was confirmed, ruling the tax act illegal due to an error in the legal premises. The decision established that the absence of payment and of a real transfer transaction precludes taxation, with material truth prevailing over the formal qualification imposed by the administration.

To determine whether the onerous alienation of a hereditary share (quinhão hereditário), in a situation where the estate consists of a single immovable property and has not yet been partitioned, constitutes an "onerous alienation of real rights over immovable property" subject to IRS (capital gains) under Article 10(1)(a) of the IRS Code.

The Tax Authority argued that, since the estate is composed exclusively of one property, the sale of the hereditary share is equivalent, in substance, to the transfer of a share of the ownership right over said property. It maintained that the heir, upon accepting the inheritance, acquires the domain and possession of the assets; therefore, the alienation of the share generates a taxable capital gain, as the consideration received is directly attributed to the real right over the asset. The Taxpayer (and the appealed arbitral decision) argued that as long as the estate remains undivided (indivisa), the heir is not the holder of a right over specific assets, but rather holds a right to a share of an autonomous patrimony (património autónomo). Consequently, the alienation of the hereditary share is the transfer of a succession right and not the alienation of a real right over an immovable property, thus falling outside the scope of the charging provision.

The Plenary of the Tax Litigation Section of the STA reasoned that, under Portuguese Civil Law, an undivided estate constitutes an autonomous patrimony whose holders possess a right to an "ideal share" of the universality, and not rights over the specific assets that comprise it. The Court emphasized that the legal nature of the hereditary share is not transmuted into a real right over immovable property simply because the estate's assets consist of a single item. The alienation of the share means the assignee (cessionário) steps into the position of the heir, with the right to participate in the future partition (partilha), and not into the position of full owner or co-owner of the property. Applying the principles of tax typicity and legality, the STA considered that Article 10(1)(a) of the CIRS requires the alienation of "real rights over immovable property." Given that the object of the sale was the "share" (a legal universality) and not the "property" (a specific thing), the taxable event provided therein does not occur. The Court reiterated that the legal form of the transaction—assignment of a share—corresponds to the legal reality of succession indivision, leaving no legal basis for taxation by analogy or interpretive extension.

The Court dismissed the Tax Authority's appeal and settled the case law (uniformizou a jurisprudência) as follows: "The alienation of a hereditary share does not constitute an 'onerous alienation of real rights over immovable property' under Article 10(1)(a) of the IRS Code; therefore, any gains resulting from such alienation are not subject to this tax."

To assess the admissibility and merits of an appeal for the settlement of case law (recurso para uniformização de jurisprudência) regarding the IRS (Category G) liability of gains resulting from the onerous alienation of a hereditary share. Specifically, whether such an act constitutes an "onerous alienation of real rights over immovable property" under Article 10(1)(a) of the IRS Code (CIRS).

The Tax Authority (Appellant) argued that there was a conflict of rulings (oposição de julgados), maintaining that the alienation of a hereditary share within an estate composed of immovable property is substantially equivalent to the transfer of a real right over such assets. Therefore, the gain should be taxed as a capital gain. It invoked the principle that the economic reality of the transaction must prevail, under penalty of excluding evident wealth increments from taxation. The Taxpayer (Respondent) upheld the conformity of the appealed arbitral decision, arguing that the object of the alienation is a succession right (a share of a legal universality) and not specific immovable assets. The taxpayer advocated for the strict application of the principle of tax typicity, alleging that as long as the estate remains undivided, the heir does not possess a real right over concrete assets that would allow the transaction to fall within the scope of the invoked charging provision.

The Plenary of the Tax Litigation Section began by analyzing the requirements of Article 152 of the CPTA. It emphasized that, even if a conflict of rulings is found, the court shall not hear the merits of the appeal if the orientation adopted in the appealed decision is in accordance with the most recently settled case law of the STA, pursuant to paragraph 3 of said article. Regarding the substantive analysis, the Court reiterated that an undivided estate constitutes an autonomous patrimony and that the heir's right pertains to the totality of that patrimony (or a share thereof) and not to specific assets. The legal reasoning was based on the following points: (i) the assignment of a hereditary share transfers the global succession position and not real rights over the assets comprising the estate; (ii) Article 10(1)(a) of the CIRS is an in rem charging provision (norma de incidência real) that specifically requires the alienation of "real rights over immovable property" — given the nature of the hereditary share, its alienation does not meet the legal definition; (iii) the Court invoked the settlement rulings (acórdãos de uniformização) issued throughout 2025 (including the ruling of 2025-04-29, Case No. 033/24.1BALSB), which established the understanding that such gains are not subject to IRS due to the absence of a charging provision.

The Court decided not to hear the merits of the appeal for the settlement of case law, as the appealed decision is in full alignment with the settled jurisprudence of the STA. The Court reaffirmed the doctrine that the alienation of a hereditary share does not constitute an onerous alienation of real rights over immovable property and is, therefore, not liable to IRS taxation under Article 10(1)(a) of the CIRS.

To determine whether, following the annulment of withholding tax acts due to the non-conformity of national provisions with European Union Law (Article 63 TFEU), the Tax Authority is obliged to pay indemnifying interest (juros indemnizatórios) to the taxpayer, and to establish the starting date (dies a quo) for its calculation.

The Appellant (A… Funds) maintained that the principle of primacy of EU Law and the obligation to restore the status quo ante (Article 100 of the LGT) require not only the refund of the unduly withheld tax but also the payment of indemnifying interest. It argued that, following the dismissal of a request for an ex officio review (revisão oficiosa) or an administrative complaint (reclamação graciosa) aimed at correcting the unlawful provision, the error becomes attributable to the Tax Administration. The Tax Authority (Respondent), in line with the appealed arbitral decision, tended to consider that in withholding tax scenarios performed by tax substitutes (substitutos tributários) without direct intervention from the TA, there is no "error attributable to the services" under Article 43(1) of the LGT to justify the right to interest from the moment of withholding, thus limiting the obligation to the mere restitution of the tax amount.

The Plenary of the STA based its decision on the duty of full reparation for damages caused by unlawful tax acts, especially when the illegality arises from a violation of EU rules. The Court clarified that: (i) the disapplication of a national provision (in this case, regarding the taxation of dividends/income of non-resident collective investment schemes) due to a conflict with the free movement of capital requires the total elimination of the consequences of the infringement; (ii) although the initial withholding is performed by a third party (the substitute), the TA incurs an error attributable to the services from the moment it maintains the illegal situation by dismissing the administrative remedies filed by the taxpayer; (iii) the Court applied Article 43(3)(d) of the LGT, which provides for indemnifying interest when the review of a tax act at the taxpayer's initiative is carried out after one year, or, in general terms, when the TA fails to remedy the illegality within a complaint or review procedure.

The Court granted the appeal and established the following thesis: "The annulment of undue withholding taxes due to a violation of EU Law grants the taxable person the right to indemnifying interest. Such interest is due and shall be calculated from the date of the dismissal of the administrative remedy (complaint or review) until the date the respective credit note is processed, ensuring the full restoration of the taxpayer's financial position."

To assess the constitutional compliance of the norm contained in Article 3(1) of the Single Circulation Tax Code (CIUC), as worded by Decree-Law No. 41/2016 of August 1st, when interpreted to mean that the tax must mandatorily fall upon the persons in whose name the vehicle's ownership is registered, preventing evidence that the actual owner (the subject holding the domain and enjoyment of the asset) is a different person, due to a potential violation of the principles of equality and ability to pay (capacidade contributiva).

The Tax Authority defended the legality of the incidence based strictly on the automobile registry, arguing that the legislator intended to ensure legal certainty and efficiency in tax collection by using the registry as an objective and non-displaceable criterion for identifying the taxable person. It maintained that the efficiency of the tax system justifies the prevalence of "registry truth" (verdade registral) over possessory reality. The Taxpayer (Respondent) alleged that the IUC, as a tax aimed at offsetting environmental and road costs, must fall upon the party who actually holds and uses the vehicle. The taxpayer argued that the impossibility of rebutting the presumption of the registry transforms the norm into an unconstitutional legal fiction, forcing the payment of a tax by someone who no longer has any patrimonial link or enjoyment of the asset, thus violating the principle of ability to pay and equality (by treating the actual owner and the mere formal holder identically).

The Constitutional Court considered that the IUC, although structured under the principle of equivalence (taxing the environmental cost and road wear), cannot totally abstract from the material relationship between the subject and the taxed object. The analysis focused on the following points: (i) the Court concluded that the norm treats substantially different situations identically: the owner who benefits from and causes costs with the vehicle, and the former owner who, due to a mere failure to register (often attributable to third parties), remains the formal holder; (ii) it was reiterated that the registry does not, by itself, reveal economic capacity, nor does it constitute the causal link that justifies environmental taxation — by preventing proof of the actual sale of the vehicle, the law creates a "fiction of ownership" that disregards material truth and the proportionality of the tax burden; (iii) the Court acknowledged the importance of administrative simplification but ruled that it cannot override fundamental rights — efficiency in collection does not legitimize the imposition of a patrimonial sacrifice on those who are extraneous to the taxable event (facto gerador).

The Court ruled unconstitutional, for violation of Articles 13(1) and 103(1) of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (CRP), the norm of Article 3(1) of the CIUC, under the interpretation that the tax is due by the person appearing in the registry as the owner even when they succeed in proving they are no longer the actual owner of the vehicle. Consequently, the Court dismissed the Tax Authority's appeal, confirming that the tax can only be demanded from the actual owner at the date of the taxable event.

To assess the constitutional compliance of the norms contained in Articles 1(2), 2, and 3(a) of the Regime creating the Banking Sector Solidarity Surcharge (ASSB), approved by Law No. 27-A/2020 of July 24th. The core issue is whether the creation of this levy, incident on the liabilities (passivo) of credit institutions, respects the principles of tax equality, ability to pay, and the prohibition of retroactive taxation (Article 103(3) of the CRP).

The Petitioners (a group of Members of Parliament) argued that the ASSB, although termed a "solidarity surcharge," constitutes a true tax on capital (liabilities) that lacks a basis of incidence revealing effective ability to pay. They contended that its application to the year 2020 violated the constitutional prohibition of retroactivity, as the law was published in July 2020 but targeted taxable events (averages of liabilities) related to prior periods. They further invoked a violation of the principle of equality for arbitrarily burdening the banking sector without a valid and current non-fiscal (extrafiscal) justification. The Assembly of the Republic (the respondent entity) defended the constitutionality of the norm, invoking the extraordinary nature of the levy and the context of economic solidarity arising from the pandemic crisis. It argued that the banking sector benefits from VAT exemptions, which would justify specific sectoral taxation as a form of compensation and to balance tax revenues, asserting that this was not an arbitrary act but a political choice for redistributive justice.

The Constitutional Court performed a rigorous analysis of the nature of the levy and the limits of the power to tax: (i) the Court classified the ASSB as a tax (imposto), given that its revenue is not intended to remunerate a service provided or a cost caused by the sector (unlike financial contributions/fees), but rather aims to fund general State expenditures (solidarity); (ii) it was considered that the incidence on liabilities (deducted of own funds and covered deposits) does not constitute a reliable indicator of wealth or income — the Court ruled that the negative differentiation of the banking sector, without demonstrating a specific benefit or cost to justify it, violates tax equality, and the "VAT exemption" was deemed insufficient to justify an autonomous tax on the balance sheet; (iii) regarding the year 2020, the Court concluded there was a direct violation of the prohibition of retroactivity — since the tax falls on liabilities determined at moments prior to the law's entry into force, it resulted in the taxation of already consolidated patrimonial facts, harming legitimate expectations and legal certainty.

The Constitutional Court decided to declare the unconstitutionality, with general binding force, of the norms that create and define the incidence of the Banking Sector Solidarity Surcharge (Articles 1(2), 2, and 3(a) of the respective Regime). This decision implies the expunging of the norms from the legal system with retroactive effects (ex tunc), allowing credit institutions to request the refund of amounts paid since 2020.

To assess the constitutional compliance of the provision contained in Article 21(1)(a) of Law No. 27-A/2020 of July 24th, insofar as it determines the application of the Banking Sector Solidarity Surcharge (ASSB) to the first half of the year 2020, in light of the constitutional prohibition of retroactive taxation enshrined in Article 103(3) of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (CRP).

The Petitioner (within the scope of an abstract review of constitutionality) argued that the provision suffers from both organic and material unconstitutionality. It contended that, since Law No. 27-A/2020 was only published in July 2020, the demand for the tax on taxable events (or periods of liability formation) occurring in the first half of 2020 constitutes authentic retroactivity. It maintained that such application violates the legitimate expectations and legal certainty of taxpayers, as it targets an economic reality already consolidated in the past. The Assembly of the Republic defended the nature of the ASSB as a "financial contribution" (contribuição financeira), alleging that the sectoral solidarity regime and the urgency in mobilizing resources to combat the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic justified the effectiveness of the levy over the entire 2020 calendar year. It argued that, in view of the exceptional public interest, the provision did not violate the essential core of protection against retroactivity.

The Constitutional Court proceeded with the legal classification (qualificação jurídica) of the ASSB, concluding that, despite its name and alleged solidarity purpose, the levy lacks the synallagmatic relationship (sinalagmaticidade)—whether in terms of specificity or a defined beneficiary group—that would characterize it as a financial contribution. Consequently, it must be classified as a true tax (imposto). Having established its nature as a tax, the Court applied the regime of absolute prohibition of retroactivity provided for in Article 103(3) of the CRP: (i) the Court considered that the provision aimed to tax past facts (the average liability of the first half of 2020) when the law did not yet exist; (ii) it reiterated that the prohibition of retroactive taxes is a fundamental guarantee for citizens and companies, not admitting exceptions based merely on economic or financial circumstances, under penalty of undermining the principle of the Rule of Law; (iii) the Court ruled that "solidarity" does not constitute a sufficient legal title to override an express and absolute constitutional prohibition in tax matters.

The Constitutional Court decided to declare the unconstitutionality, with general binding force, of the provision contained in Article 21(1)(a) of Law No. 27-A/2020 of July 24th, in the segment referring to the calculation of the tax for the first half of 2020. The decision determines that the tax assessments (liquidações) performed based on this retroactive provision are void, and the amounts unduly collected must be refunded to the banking institutions.

To assess the constitutional compliance of the norm of Article 44(2) of the IRS Code, under the interpretation that, for the purpose of determining gains subject to IRS (capital gains) arising from the onerous alienation of immovable property, the realization value (valor de realização) is mandatorily the value considered for Municipal Property Transfer Tax (IMT) assessment purposes (or that which would be), whenever this value is higher than the declared price, without allowing the production of evidence to the contrary (irrebuttable presumption).

The Public Prosecution Service (and appellants in previous cases) argued that the provision establishes an irrebuttable presumption of income that prevents the taxpayer from demonstrating that the actual sale price was lower than the Tax Asset Value (Valor Patrimonial Tributário - VPT). It was alleged that such an imposition violates the principles of ability to pay, tax equality, and the prohibition of taxing fictitious profits, as the tax ceases to fall upon the effective gain and instead falls upon a pre-defined administrative value. The Tax Authority (in indirect defense of the provision in the underlying proceedings) maintained that the mechanism aims to combat tax evasion and fraud, ensuring the simplicity of the system and efficiency in collection by using the VPT as an objective and secure criterion for establishing the realization value in real estate transactions.

The Plenary of the Constitutional Court based its decision on the consolidation of previous jurisprudence (Judgments Nos. 211/2017, 488/2021, and 110/2024), concluding that: (i) the tax system must aim at taxing real income. By preventing proof that the sale price was lower than the VPT, the legislator allows the taxation of non-existent gains, disregarding the necessary link between the tax burden and the taxpayer's effective wealth; (ii) there was unjustified discrimination compared to Corporate Income Tax (IRC) taxpayers, for whom the legal regime allows the rebuttal of the market value presumption (Article 139 of the IRC Code); (iii) although combating fraud is a legitimate aim, the irrebuttable nature of the presumption is an excessive and unnecessary measure, as the same goal could be achieved by allowing the taxpayer the right to produce evidence, as already occurs in other taxes on wealth and income.

The Constitutional Court decided to declare the unconstitutionality, with general binding force, of the norm contained in Article 44(2) of the IRS Code, under the interpretation that it establishes an irrebuttable presumption. This decision obliges the Tax Authority to admit, in all cases, evidence that the actual realization value was lower than the VPT for capital gains assessment purposes, allowing aggrieved taxpayers to request a review of their tax assessments.

To determine whether the principle of free movement of capital (Article 63 TFEU) precludes national legislation (Germany) that provides for the inclusion, in the tax base of a resident company, of the undistributed profits of a company established in a third country (Switzerland) in which the former holds a majority stake, when those profits are subject to a lower level of taxation than the national level. Additionally, to assess whether such legislation can benefit from the standstill clause provided for in Article 64(1) TFEU.

The Tax Authority defended the applicability of the German Foreign Tax Act (Außensteuergesetz – AStG), maintaining that it aims to prevent the shifting of profits to low-tax jurisdictions and the deferral of tax. It further argued that the provision was protected by Article 64(1) TFEU, as it refers to a restriction existing on December 31, 1993, relating to direct investments. Finally, it alleged that the restriction was justified by the need to ensure the effectiveness of fiscal supervision and to combat aggressive tax planning. The Taxpayer (X-GmbH) alleged that the taxation of undistributed profits of a foreign subsidiary under a fiscal transparency/attribution regime constitutes an unjustified restriction on the free movement of capital. It contended that the legislation in question did not allow the taxpayer to demonstrate the existence of real economic reasons for locating the subsidiary in Switzerland, representing an irrebuttable presumption of tax evasion that violates the principle of proportionality.

The CJEU began by clarifying that, as the situation involves a third country, only the free movement of capital is applicable. It analyzed the standstill clause (Article 64(1) TFEU), concluding that it may cover legislation which, although amended after 1993, maintains the essential legal framework of the original restriction; however, it is for the national court to verify whether the amendments to the AStG introduced new substantive obstacles. Regarding the substance, the Court confirmed that the inclusion of the subsidiary's profits in the parent company's tax base constitutes a restriction on Article 63 TFEU, as it discourages investment in companies situated outside the EU. Regarding justifications, the Court reiterated its case law on the fight against abusive practices, stating that the restriction is only admissible if it targets "purely artificial arrangements." In the context of third countries, the Court admitted a different margin of appreciation from that applied within the Union (e.g., Cadbury Schweppes), acknowledging that the Administration may face greater difficulty in verifying economic reality due to limited administrative cooperation. Nonetheless, it emphasized that the legislation cannot prevent the taxpayer from producing evidence regarding the economic substance of their participation without overriding reasons of public interest.

The Court ruled that Article 63 TFEU precludes CFC legislation that taxes undistributed profits of subsidiaries in third countries if it does not allow the taxpayer to demonstrate that the arrangement is not artificial and that the holdings correspond to real economic activities, unless such legislation is protected by the standstill clause of Article 64(1) TFEU (which requires that the restriction relates to direct investments and has existed uninterruptedly since 1993).

To determine the correct interpretation of Article 25(2)(a) of the Double Taxation Convention (DTC) between Portugal and the USA, specifically whether, for the purpose of eliminating double taxation on royalties obtained in the USA by a resident entity in Portugal, the tax credit must be calculated on an isolated basis for each income item ("item-by-item") or if it allows for the utilization of excess foreign tax paid against the limit of the proportional Portuguese theoretical tax liability for those incomes.

The Taxpayer (Z..., S.A.) argued that the DTC and Article 91 of the CIRC (Corporate Income Tax Code) must be interpreted to ensure tax neutrality and the effective elimination of double taxation. It contended that, since tax was withheld in the USA at a rate higher than the fraction of the IRC tax liability corresponding to those incomes in Portugal, the tax credit method should allow for an aggregated consideration to avoid the loss of the tax paid abroad, rejecting a restrictive interpretation that limits the credit to the lower of the two values (tax paid vs. tax due in Portugal) on a strictly segmented basis for each income line. The Tax Authority maintained that the method adopted by the Portugal-USA DTC is the ordinary tax credit method. According to this rule, the tax credit is capped at the fraction of the IRC tax liability, calculated before the deduction, corresponding to the income that may be taxed in the USA. Thus, if the tax paid abroad is higher than the tax that would be due in Portugal on those same incomes, the excess is neither deductible nor eligible for carry-forward, as the Residence State would otherwise be subsidizing the tax of the Source State.

The Plenary of the STA analyzed the admissibility requirements of the appeal and the legal merits: (i) the Court reaffirmed that the DTC establishes the common or ordinary tax credit method. This method implies that Portugal, as the Residence State, waives its tax liability only up to the amount it would itself collect on that net income. (ii) the ruling emphasized that the OECD Model Convention Commentaries, while not absolutely binding, are fundamental auxiliary elements of interpretation. They reinforce that the credit limitation aims to prevent the Residence State from losing tax revenue beyond what its own taxation on foreign income would be. (iii) the Court validated the understanding that the deduction cannot exceed the share of the Portuguese tax, calculated before the deduction, corresponding to the income taxed in the other State. If the rate applied at source (USA) is higher than the effective rate in Portugal, the difference is a cost to the taxpayer that the DTC does not aim to eliminate, thereby protecting the fiscal sovereignty of the Residence State.

The Court dismissed the appeal for the settlement of case law, upholding the appealed decision. It established the understanding that, within the scope of the Portugal-USA DTC and Article 91 of the CIRC, the credit to eliminate international double taxation is limited to the fraction of the IRC tax liability corresponding to the gross income from abroad, with no allowance for the deduction of any excess tax paid in the Source State that exceeds this proportional limit.

To assess the constitutionality of the rule set forth in Article 154 of Law No. 7-A/2016 (State Budget for 2016), insofar as it attributes an interpretative nature to the new wording of Item 17.3.4 of the General Table of Stamp Duty (TGIS). The central problem lies in determining whether such legal characterization violates the principle of the prohibition of retroactive taxes, enshrined in Article 103(3) of the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (CRP), by seeking to retroactively apply Stamp Duty to interbank commissions (specifically the MIF) charged prior to the entry into force of the aforementioned law.

The Public Prosecutor's Office, relying on a series of previous decisions by the Constitutional Court and CAAD (Tax Arbitration Center), maintained that the rule is substantively innovative and not merely interpretative. It argued that, prior to Law No. 7-A/2016, commissions charged between banking entities (MIF) were not subject to Stamp Duty, as Item 17.3.4 provided for incidence on "financial operations" where the holder of the economic interest would typically be the client and not the financial institutions themselves. Thus, by assigning an interpretative effect, the legislator was creating a disguised retroactive tax. The Assembly of the Republic, through a technical note, submitted the merits of the case to the Court, implicitly defending the legislator's freedom of conformation in clarifying the scope of tax rules when they generate application doubts.

The Constitutional Court reaffirmed the understanding established in consolidated case law (namely in Rulings No. 566/2020 and 196/2021). The Plenary considered that the rule in Article 154 of Law No. 7-A/2016 is truly innovative, altering the framework of objective and subjective incidence of Stamp Duty. The technical reasoning highlighted that: (i) the previous wording of Item 17.3.4, read in conjunction with Article 3(3)(g) of the Stamp Duty Code, presupposed that the tax burden fell on the client, which excluded commissions paid exclusively between banks (such as the MIF in ATM/Multibanco operations); (ii) by declaring the rule "interpretative," the legislator aimed to validate tax assessments from past periods that lacked a clear legal basis, violating legal certainty and the taxpayers' legitimate expectations; (iii) since the rule expands the scope of taxation to past taxable events, it constitutes a direct violation of Article 103(3) of the CRP, which prohibits the retroactivity of tax law in its highest degree (authentic retroactivity).

The Court decided to declare, with generally binding force, the unconstitutionality of the rule in Article 154 of Law No. 7-A/2016, of March 30, insofar as it attributes an interpretative nature to the wording given by Article 153 of the same law to Item 17.3.4 of the TGIS, regarding amounts charged between banking entities for card operations at automated teller machines (MIF). The final thesis establishes that the legislator cannot, by means of an interpretative law, subject to tax events occurring before its entry into force that were not unequivocally taxable under the old law.